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OPINION OF THE COURT 
           
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 Appellants, USX Corporation and the Bessemer and Lake 
Erie Railroad Company, sued the reorganized Penn Central 
Transportation Company (now known as American Premier 
Underwriters, Inc.) for contribution and indemnity based on Penn 
Central's participation with them in an antitrust conspiracy. 
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Although appellants were held liable for nearly $600 million in 
damages from that conspiracy, see In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore 
Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 1144 (3d Cir. 1993), the courts ruled 
that the direct claims against Penn Central were barred by its 
reorganization. 
 In response to the underlying lawsuit for contribution 
and indemnity, Penn Central filed a petition in its bankruptcy 
case to require the dismissal of the suit, alleging that the 1978 
Consummation Order and Final Decree barred it.  The district 
court granted the petition.  In re Penn Central Transp. Co., No. 
70-347 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 1994).  We will reverse. 
I. 
 The Penn Central bankruptcy proceeding is more than a 
quarter-century old; and the facts of the antitrust conspiracy 
are even older.  Andrew Carnegie built the Bessemer to link his 
Pittsburgh-area steel mills to raw materials sources, 
specifically iron ore, received from ore ships at Lake Erie 
ports.  The railroad was a wholly-owned subsidiary of United 
States Steel Corporation (now USX Corporation) until 1989, when 
it was spun off.  USX, however, retained liability for the 
antitrust claims at issue under its indemnity agreement with the 
Bessemer. 
 Beginning in 1956, the Bessemer and several other 
railroads, including the Penn Central's predecessors, entered 
into a joint ratemaking agreement, which was given limited 
immunity from antitrust attack under § 5(a) of the Reed-Bulwinkle 
Act, ch. 491, 62 Stat. 472 (1948).  In 1970, the Penn Central 
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filed a bankruptcy petition under § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act of 
1898.  This action, and the bankruptcies of several other 
regional railroads, motivated Congress to pass the Regional Rail 
Reorganization Act of 1973, under which the Penn Central conveyed 
its rail assets to Conrail in 1976.  In 1978, the district court 
entered its Final Decree and Consummation Order, which included a 
limitation or bar date for all claims against the debtor.  The 
Consummation Order transferred the reorganized Penn Central's 
railroad property and discharged it from any further claims 
predicated upon its pre-consummation acts or conduct.  The 
district court retained jurisdiction over any claims that might 
later be asserted against Penn Central. 
 In 1980, Pinney Dock and Litton filed antitrust 
complaints against the Bessemer, Penn Central and other 
railroads.  The claims against Penn Central were held barred by 
the discharge.  In re Penn Central Transp. Co. ("Pinney Dock"), 
42 B.R. 657, 676 (E.D. Pa. 1984), aff'd, 771 F.2d 762 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1033, 106 S. Ct. 596 (1985).  Between 1982 
and 1984, several plaintiffs filed suits under federal and Ohio 
antitrust law against the signatories to the § 5(a) agreement, 
including Penn Central and the Bessemer.  These claims were 
consolidated as the "MDL 587" litigation.  The district court 
dismissed Penn Central as a defendant, concluding that because 
the claims arose pre-consummation they were discharged.  All 
remaining defendants except the Bessemer settled with plaintiffs. 
The Bessemer went to trial and lost.  Judgment was entered 
against it in excess of $592 million, and paid by USX.  The 
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Bessemer and USX then filed complaints in federal and Ohio courts 
seeking indemnity and contribution from Penn Central, as the 
instigator, enforcer and primary beneficiary of the conspiracy.  
 II. 
 The predicate conduct of appellants' antitrust 
liability began before Penn Central filed its bankruptcy 
petition.  Thus, Penn Central asserts that appellants' claims 
against it have been discharged by the Consummation Order and 
Final Decree.  Appellants argue, however, that their claims 
seeking contribution and indemnity could not possibly have been 
filed before the 1978 bar date, because they were not sued until 
later; and, hence should be treated as post-consummation claims, 
i.e., neither discharged nor barred. 
A. 
 We look to nonbankruptcy law to determine when these 
claims accrued.  See Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 758 
F.2d 936, 941 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 864, 106 S. Ct. 
183 (1985); In re M. Frenville Co., 744 F.2d 332, 335 (3d Cir. 
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160, 105 S. Ct. 911 (1985).  We 
agree with appellants that their claims for contribution and 
indemnity could not accrue until the MDL 587 complaints were 
filed against them between 1982 and 1984.  In Frenville, applying 
New York law, we opined that:  
 For both separate actions and 
third-party complaints, a claim for 
contribution or indemnification does not 
accrue at the time of the commission of the 
underlying act, but rather at the time of the 
payment of the judgment flowing from the act.  
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744 F.2d at 337.  The MDL 587 claims arose under federal and Ohio 
law.  That law, for our purposes at least, is consistent with the 
law applied in Frenville.  For example, the Ohio Supreme Court 
has stated that 
the right to contribution is inchoate from 
the time of the creation of the relationship 
giving rise to the common burden until the 
payment by a co-obligor of more than his 
proportional share, and . . . the right 
becomes complete and enforceable only upon a 
payment by the claimant extinguishing the 
whole of the common obligation. 
 
National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Whitmer, 435 N.E.2d 1121, 1123 (Ohio 
1982); see Ross v. Spiegel, Inc., 373 N.E.2d 1288, 1295 (Ohio 
App. 1977) (similar rule for indemnity).  Applying federal 
admiralty law, we reached a similar conclusion.  See Sea-Land 
Serv., Inc. v. United States, 874 F.2d 169, 171 (3d Cir. 1989). 
B. 
 That conclusion frames the issue that was before the 
district court and is now before us: whether a claim that arose 
after the 1978 Consummation Order was nevertheless discharged by 
that order.  We have already answered that question in the 
negative, at least in the context of the § 77 reorganization 
presented by this case.1 
                     
1Indeed, our holding today was foreshadowed two decades ago in 
the § 77 case of In re Reading Co., 404 F. Supp. 1249 (E.D. Pa. 
1975), which involved similar facts.  There, the court held that 
claims for contribution and indemnity asserted against a bankrupt 
railroad were not prepetition in nature--even though the facts 
giving rise to primary liability occurred before the railroad 
declared bankruptcy--because the railroad settled with the 
plaintiff post-bankruptcy and only then did the cause of action 
for contribution and indemnity accrue.  Id. at 1251. 
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 In Schweitzer,2 plaintiffs were exposed to asbestos 
during their employment with the Reading Railroad and the Central 
Railroad of New Jersey.  Later, but before plaintiffs' injuries 
manifested themselves, these railroads consummated a 
reorganization under § 77.  When plaintiffs discovered their 
injuries, they filed FELA actions against Conrail, which had 
succeeded to the former railroads' rail assets. 
 Conrail argued that the consummation order discharged 
any claims asserted by the injured workers, but we disagreed, 
noting first "that plaintiffs' rights only could have been 
affected by the discharge of all 'claims' against their employer 
if they had 'claims' within the meaning of section 77 prior to 
the consummation date of their employer's reorganization."  Id. 
at 941.  We concluded "that if plaintiffs had causes of action 
that existed under FELA prior to the relevant consummation dates 
they had 'claims.'"Id.  We then analyzed plaintiffs' claims under 
FELA and concluded that no cause of action accrued until the 
manifestation of plaintiffs' injuries.  Id. at 942. 
 This case is analogous to Schweitzer.  Like the 
subclinical injuries there, appellants here had no cause of 
action against Penn Central pre-consummation.  Because they could 
not have filed this action during the Penn Central bankruptcy, 
                     
2See also In re Central R.R. Co., 950 F.2d 887, 892 (3d Cir. 
1991) (following Schweitzer), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 971, 112 S. 
Ct. 1586 (1992); Zulkowski v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 852 F.2d 
73, 74 (3d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 994, 109 S. Ct. 
559 (1988). 
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Schweitzer's lesson is that their claims could not have been 
discharged. 
 Penn Central argues that appellants had pre-
consummation, contingent, and dischargeable claims.  It relies on 
our discussion in Schweitzer of the early § 77B case of In re 
Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corp. ("RKO"), 106 F.2d 22 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 308 U.S. 622, 60 S. Ct. 377 (1939).  We find that case to 
be inapposite. 
 In RKO, landlords leased property to a corporation's 
subsidiary, on condition that the parent corporation guarantee 
rent payments.  When the parent went bankrupt, the subsidiary was 
still paying rent.  The landlords did not file a claim against 
the bankrupt's estate.  But after the debtor's reorganization 
when the subsidiary defaulted, they asserted that their claim on 
the guarantee was not discharged.  The Court of Appeals 
disagreed: 
The appellants . . . were not as [a] matter 
of law entitled to stand aloof and obtain a 
continuance of the guaranties unaffected by 
reorganization, the equivalent of a 
preference for them over unsecured creditors 
with accrued or determinable claims.  What 
they were entitled to was treatment as nearly 
like that accorded to ordinary unsecured 
creditors as the circumstances permitted[.] 
 
Id. at 26-27. 
 Penn Central maintains that appellants here stand in 
the same position as the landlords in RKO.  Schweitzer, however, 
counsels otherwise;  
 The reasoning in Radio-Keith-Orpheum is 
not controlling here, however, because we do 
not believe plaintiffs had "interests" of any 
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character before injury manifested itself. In 
our view, before one can have an "interest" 
which is cognizable as a contingent claim 
under section 77, one must have a legal 
relationship relevant to the purported 
interest from which that interest may flow. 
 
 In Radio-Keith-Orpheum, although there 
had been no breach of the lease agreement and 
thus there was no present cause of action 
pursuant to the guaranties, there was a 
guarantor-guarantee legal relationship from 
which an interest in the guaranty could 
flow.3  There is no legal relationship, 
however, between a tortfeasor and a tort 
victim until a tort actually has occurred. . 
. . 
 
758 F.2d at 943 (citation omitted). 
 Undaunted, Penn Central asserts that the § 5(a) 
agreement to which the Bessemer was a party takes this case out 
of the ambit of Schweitzer and places it squarely within the 
holding of RKO.  We cannot agree.  The key to Schweitzer's 
treatment of RKO was that the RKO landlords had explicitly 
bargained to look to the unreorganized debtor for their security. 
Here, however, the § 5(a) agreement confers no right of 
indemnification.  That agreement, although the source of 
appellants' primary liability to the MDL 587 plaintiffs, simply 
does not evidence an intent to look to the pre-reorganized Penn 
Central for contribution or indemnity claims.  Put simply, 
                     
3Accord Frenville, 744 F.2d at 336 ("The present case is 
different from one involving an indemnity or surety contract. 
When parties agree in advance that one party will indemnify the 
other party in the event of a certain occurrence, there exists a 
right to payment, albeit contingent, Such a surety relationship 
is the classic case of a contingent right to payment under the 
Code--the right to payment exists as of the signing of the 
agreement, but it is dependent on the occurrence of a future 
event." (Citations omitted.)). 
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although there was a legal relationship between the Bessemer and 
the Penn Central's predecessors, there was no legal relationship 
from which a prepetition interest in contribution or indemnity 
could flow.  See id. at 943. 
 This conclusion is supported by the § 77 case of In re 
Penn Central Transp. Co. ("Paoli Yard"), 944 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 
1991).  Penn Central and its predecessors operated a railroad 
yard on an electrified portion of its line.  The land became 
contaminated from PCBs common in the electrical transformers of 
the period.  As part of the Penn Central reorganization, the 
Paoli Yard was conveyed to Conrail, and later to SEPTA.  Two 
years post-consummation, however, Congress imposed retroactive 
liability on former owners of toxic waste sites. The United 
States sued both SEPTA and Conrail, and Conrail sought 
contribution and indemnity from the reorganized Penn Central. Id. 
at 165-66. 
 The district court, construing Schweitzer narrowly, 
held that the Consummation Order barred the claims against the 
reorganized Penn Central. Id. at 166.  We reversed, noting first 
that  
at the moment of the bankruptcy discharge and 
the inception of the injunction, CERCLA had 
not yet been passed by Congress. Indeed 
CERCLA was not enacted until 1980. 
Consequently, at the time of the Consummation 
Order, there was no statutory basis for 
liability to be asserted against [Penn 
Central] by the petitioners.  Just as the 
employees in Schweitzer had no recognizable 
tort causes of action under the FELA prior to 
the employer railroad's relevant consummation 
dates, the petitioners here could not have 
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brought claims under CERCLA prior to the 
Consummation Date. 
 
Id. at 167.  We then went on to reject the theory that a 
contingent, dischargeable claim existed pre-consummation: 
Under the facts now before us in this appeal, 
it was not until the passage of CERCLA that a 
legal relationship was created between the 
petitioners and [Penn Central] relevant to 
the petitioners' potential causes of action 
such that an interest could flow.  Because 
this legal relationship did not evolve until 
after the Consummation Date, the petitioners 
did not have contingent claims against [Penn 
Central].  Accordingly, our decision in 
Schweitzer leads us to the conclusion that 
the petitioners' asserted claims under CERCLA 
did not constitute dischargeable claims 
within the meaning of section 77 and thus 
survive the discharge of the debtor. 
 
Id. at 167-68 (emphasis added). 
 In Paoli Yard, we made explicit what was implicit in 
Schweitzer: it is not sufficient for dischargeability purposes 
that there was some pre-consummation legal relationship between 
the debtor and the party seeking now to assert a claim; rather, 
that relationship must be relevant to the claimant's cause of 
action.  When CERCLA was enacted, two fundamental changes 
occurred in that relationship: first, Conrail became primarily 
liable for the toxic waste cleanup.  Second, and more importantly 
for our purposes, CERCLA made Penn Central potentially liable to 
Conrail for contribution and indemnity.  Only then did a legal 
relationship relevant to the cause of action arise.4  
                     
4Likewise, in Schweitzer, there was undoubtedly an employer-
employee contractual relationship between the railroads and the 
injured workers.  That relationship, by itself, was not 
sufficiently relevant to their tort claims that the workers 
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 Although not necessary to our holding, Frenville also 
supports our conclusion that appellants' claims against the 
reorganized Penn Central were not discharged.  In that case, 
banks sued an accounting firm for negligently preparing the 
debtor's financial statements.  The firm sought relief from the 
automatic stay to claim contribution and indemnity from the 
debtor.  744 F.2d at 333-34.  We held that, because the firm's 
claims for contribution and indemnity could not accrue until the 
banks sued the firm, the firm's claims arose post-petition and 
were nondischargeable; hence, the automatic stay was 
inapplicable.  Id. at 337. 
 Frenville, of course, arose under the Bankruptcy Code, 
not § 77 of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act.  Key to our analysis in 
Frenville was the definition of "claim" as a "right to payment" 
in 11 U.S.C. § 101(4), which we held was intended by Congress to 
be interpreted broadly.  See id. at 336.  Penn Central seizes on 
this distinction and urges us not to apply Frenville to this § 77 
case.  This, however, is a distinction without a difference. 
Section 77(b) of the 1898 Act defined "claims" as "debts" or 
"other interests of whatever character."  In neither brief nor 
argument could counsel for Penn Central explain how these two 
definitions differ and why that difference should lead us to a 
different result here than in Frenville.5 
                                                                  
somehow agreed to look only to the debtors' estates for 
compensation. 
5In response to Penn Central's argument that Frenville was 
wrongly decided and has not been well received by courts outside 
the Third Circuit, we direct its attention to Third Circuit 
Internal Operating Procedure 9.1. 
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 Our holding makes for sound policy.  Appellants could 
not have been expected to file a contingent claim pre-
consummation based on the speculative possibility that their 
conduct, which began in the 1950s, might have extended beyond the 
bounds of its statutory antitrust immunity and that they might 
successfully be sued years later.  If the Bessemer were required 
to act with such clairvoyance, then countless other entities that 
did business with the Penn Central and its predecessors, would 
also have been required to file contingent claims.  Affixing 
value to these claims, both individually and in the aggregate, 
would be impossible, and the uncertainty thus created would 
render any reorganization plan unworkable.  Indeed, we find the 
Schweitzer analysis of when asbestos-caused disease claims accrue 
both analogous and persuasive: 
If mere exposure to asbestos were sufficient 
to give rise to a F.E.L.A. cause of action, 
countless seemingly healthy railroad workers, 
workers who might never manifest injury, 
would have tort claims cognizable in federal 
court.  It is obvious that proof of damages 
in such cases would be highly speculative, 
likely resulting in windfalls for those who 
never take ill and insufficient compensation 
for those who do.  
 
758 F.2d at 942. 
 C. 
 As a final ground for affirmance, Penn Central argues 
that, as a matter of law, appellants have no valid claims for 
indemnity or contribution.  This argument, however, goes to the 
merits of appellants' indemnity and contribution claims currently 
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pending in other courts, which will proceed there once our 
mandate issues.  Hence, we do not reach the issue. 
III. 
 Because appellants' claims against Penn Central arose 
post-consummation and were not discharged, we will reverse and 
remand the cause for the district court to deny Penn Central's 
petition. 
